Take GMAC Down

The big news, really, is that GMAC needs $11.5 billion (and will need $4 billion more if it takes on Chrylser financing).  Can you think of anyone who would loan GMAC $11.50 right now, not to mention $11.5 billion?  Who should they even ask?  Well, I can think of one guy.  Can you guess?

OK, him too, but I’m not allowed to blog about Tim Geithner anymore, am I?  Keep guessing.

Getting warmer, but who knows if he’ll be able to stay awake long enough to count out the money (which, yes, he might have on hand). 

You don’t even know who that is, do you?  It’s OK; you’re not alone.  Hint: It’s Gary Locke.  He’s the Commerce Secretary.

Give up?  The auto task force guy with the power of the purse on this one might actually be this guy:

That’s Steven Rattner, the Car Czar.  Not really sure why he’s so far in the back during this Shame on You Chrysler Lenders speech, since he’s apparently the guy who fired Rick Wagoner at G.M. and heavily rumored to be the guy who told Chrysler’s non-complying creditors the White House would destroy them if they didn’t cooperate.  (He’s also, according to that first link, the guy who’s eyeing Tim Geithner’s parking space at Treasury — or at least was before his own possible scandal popped up).  Rattner is also the guy who will be poring over G.M.’s you-have-60-days-to-get-it-together filing, which is due at the end of this month.

Also due 30 days from now (June 8, to be precise)?  A plan from each of the banks listed above that needs to raise capital about how, exactly, those banks plan to raise that needed capital by November. I’m guessing GMAC’s plan can be summed up in two words: Government bailout.

So my thought is this: How can GMAC make any kind of plan without including the viability of GM (and Chrsyler, for which it might be taking up sales financing for) in its plan?  And if it includes those pieces of the puzzle, doesn’t that make Rattner the point man?

This seems like a good thing. Rattner’s the one who spear-headed the Chrysler effort, which ended, you may remember, with not much government concession to bondholders.  Rattner has shown that he’s willing to see a car company fail.  It can’t be that hard for GMAC to imagine that he wouldn’t mind watching a car company’s finance wing fail, too.

And though Treasury has said that they will support GMAC as needed, I’d guess that’s a reassurance meant more for its counterparties than for GMAC itself.  This is a bank that probably needs to go into receivership.  It’s a bank that, as Floyd Norris writes, “concluded, disastrously, that a good way to offset possible losses on auto loans was to get into mortgage lending.”  Going forward, what are the prospects for GMAC to revive?

I’m not convinced that a GMAC failure would be the same systemic threat that a failure of Citi or BoA might be.  First, I don’t think it would send a confidence shock through the system if GMAC went down — in fact, I think it’s more shocking that it’s being allowed to stand.

Second, GMAC does provide financing for dealerships to buy new inventory, and then provides financing for customers to buy that inventory — but if a contraction in that particular market is going to happen anyway (and it certainly seems it will, as part of Chrysler’s bankruptcy deal will include dealership closings), why not just hand GMAC off to the FDIC now?  Why not call this bank, and all of its attached pieces, a failure?

If anyone’s going to have a come-to-Jesus meeting with this bank, Steven Rattner seems like the guy to do it.  He’s probably got the clearest picture of GM’s predicament right now, and I hope that qualifies him to deal with their semi-detached financing arm, too.

Stress Testes of Steel

I cannot explain how much I love that headline, and how hard I’m going to work to make it relevant.  So the stress test results [.pdf] came out yesterday, and revealed that, while none of the banks are currently considered insolvent, several of them could go that way if the government’s “more adverse” scenario of unemployment hitting 10.3% comes to pass.  So they’re asking 11 bank-holding companies to raise capital to meet their preferred “cushion” level.  Here’s the summary of who needs what, in billions, as per the Wall Street Journal’s colorful front page:

Bank of America: $33.9
Wells Fargo: $13.7
Citigroup: $5.5
GMAC: $11.5
Regions Financial: $2.5
SunTrust: $2.2
KeyCorp: $1.8
Fifth Third: $1.1
PNC Financia: $l .6
Morgan Stanley: $1.8
J.P. Morgan Chase, BB&T, Capital One, US Bancorp, MetLife, Goldman Sachs, Bank of NY Mellon, American Express, and State Street: $0
Having six months to raise new, private capital: Priceless.

Let me highlight the surprises:

• Wells Fargo needs quite a bit of funding to be adequately cushioned against any further decline in the economy.  The predictions for Wells are already being called overly optimistic by some, because Wells — like several of the passing institutions — is heavily invested in real estate that may go further south than the government’s prediction.  
• Capital One is not on the needy list — let’s hope credit card defaults don’t surpass the government’s more adverse scenario numbers (18-20% losses).
• The Citi number seems low — until you realize that they need to raise $5.5 billion IN ADDITION to the $45 billion from the government that they just converted to common stock and the $3.4 billion it just sold Nikko for.  So put them down for $50 billion and change.
• GMAC suuuuucks.  I’ve got another post on that one coming later, though.

So, what do you do, the day after the government tells everyone that you aren’t sufficiently capitalized to survive a 1.4 percent rise in unemployment?  If you’re Wells Fargo and Morgan Stanley, well, you use that encouraging news to raise $7.5 billion each today:

In the capital-raising exercises, Wells Fargo sold $7.5 billion of common stock; regulators had ruled it needs to fill a capital hole of $13.7 billion.

Morgan Stanley raised $8 billion by selling $4 billion in common stock and $4 billion in bonds. It increased the total amount it raised compared with its initial plans by $3 billion because of strong investor demand, it said. Regulators had declared that the investment bank needed to raise money to fill a $1.8 billion hole.

Here’s my question — who bought those public offerings?  Friends of Bernie Madoff?  The Morgan Stanley results show that 45% of their expected loan losses are in Commercial Real Estate Loans, a category in which we aren’t even close to the bottom of the market — but their overall.  They did, however, manage to raise $6.5 billion last quarter, and their overall exposure to bad parts of the market is much slimmer than most.

But how bad did people think this was going to be that the news that Wells Fargo’s adverse-case-scenario losses will be $89.6 billion made Wall Street happy?  Shares were up 3.4 today (13.8 percent) on the news.  What?

I’m glad that there’s private capital to be found to shore up these banks, because it does mean that less government money will be needed.  But the sheer, amazing balls of these guys, to use a report of “it’s not as bad as we thought!” to raise billions of dollars — it certainly reminds us that nothing’s really changed on Wall Street in terms of risky behavior.

New York Fed Chair Stephen Friedman Resigns: About Time

The chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve of New York, Stephen Friedman, resigned today — a resignation doubtlessly timed to coincide with the much bigger news of the day, the release of the stress test results.  (I’ll get back to those in a bit).  Though he had earlier announced his intention to resign at the end of the year, he moved the date up as criticisms of his overlapping role at the Fed and on the board of Goldman Sachs have mounted.

The Wall Street Journal ran an A-1 story this week that started thus:

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York shaped Washington’s response to the financial crisis late last year, which buoyed Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and other Wall Street firms. Goldman received speedy approval to become a bank holding company in September and a $10 billion capital injection soon after.

During that time, the New York Fed’s chairman, Stephen Friedman, sat on Goldman’s board and had a large holding in Goldman stock, which because of Goldman’s new status as a bank holding company was a violation of Federal Reserve policy.

The New York Fed asked for a waiver, which, after about 2½ months, the Fed granted. While it was weighing the request, Mr. Friedman bought 37,300 more Goldman shares in December. They’ve since risen $1.7 million in value.

Mr. Friedman also was overseeing the search for a new president of the New York Fed, an officer who has a critical role in setting monetary policy at the Federal Reserve. The choice was a former Goldman executive.

The WSJ has been putting up new pieces every day as criticism of Friedman’s moves has mounted.  He’s not a bad target.  He’s purchased more than 50,000 new shares in Goldman since the bank came under Fed regulation last fall, and never mentioned any of those purchases to the NYFed.  His claims that he saw “no conflict whatsoever in owning shares” is at best self-deluding and more likely disingenuous.  Whether or not Friedman was involved in day-to-day decision making at the Fed — and his spear-heading of the search for a new president certainly makes him seem very involved — as a Class C director, appointed to represent the public, holding shares in any bank or bank holding company seems like a dangerous contradiction.

Now, it’s true that Friedman wasn’t initially in conflict with Fed policy — only when Goldman became a bank-holding company, instead of an investment bank, did he come into explicit conflict with the rules, and at that point the NYFed lawyers sought a waiver.  In January, they concluded he hadn’t broken any internal rules — and even in the statement released by the NYFed, the general counsel says “these purchases did not violate any Federal Reserve statute, rule or policy.”

Which makes it seem all the more important that those statutes, rules, and policies get changed. 

Though Friedman showed some terrible judgment here, the other villain of this story is whoever in the Washington, D.C. Fed offices decided to grant the waiver that allowed Friedman to continue in his conflicting role.  The defense that the NYFed has mustered so far for keeping Friedman around is that his leadership was necessary because the NYFed was already functioning without a president, after Tim Geithner became the Treasury nominee in November.  If that was true — if Friedman was so valuable to the company — then the company should have worked harder to convince Friedman to sell of his shares and resign from Goldman.  Instead, they chose to grant a waiver to a rule that, really, is a pretty reasonable rule, one that’s built to arm against exactly the kinds of conflicted decisions that seem to have been made here.

The WSJ reports that many of the other 11 regional Fed banks already have or are supportive of changing and clarifying the rules.  I hope that’s true.  Until then, it falls upon the Wall Street Journals of the world to find this stuff out and push for change — and we may be destined to see the resolution of the problem coming, as it did in this case, too late.

Ten Banks Expected to “Fail” Stress Tests

It’s Stress Test Week!  (Again).  But this time, we’re talking results instead of just, you know, hey, guess what’s happening behind closed doors.  The nation’s 19 largest banks have all seen their results by now, and rumors have been flying since Monday about what, exactly, those results showed.  I thought I’d do a round-up of expectations now, and then come back tomorrow and see how the banks fared in reality.  I’ve waxed on about what the tests mean before.  And I’ve said my faith in Treasury rests largely on the results.  So here it is: judgment day.  Rumor has it, ten banks aren’t expected to pass (which is different than a bank failing outright, because if they don’t pass, they’re given time to raise capital).  Here’s the Top Ten:

Citibank is held by Citigroup.  It’s expected to need a major infusion of cash — talk is $10 billion.  Citi apparently appealed the government’s findings.  Just this week, it sold its Japanese finance company, Nikko Cordial, for about $3.4 billion (it bought Nikko in 2008 for around $18B) to raise some much-needed cash.  Citi is largely considered the bell-weather of this test, in that if it’s deemed to “pass,” the rest of the test should be considered a joke.
Current government investment in Citi: ~$45 billion (some in common stock).

Bank of America is the nation’s largest retail bank, as of last fall when it bought Merrill Lynch — and is also expected to be the bank in the most trouble, since last fall it — hey! — bought Merrill Lynch.  BoA is expected to need a whopping $33.9 billion in additional capital post-test.
Current TARP investment in BoA: ~$45 billion (unless you count the government’s asset guarantees in.  Then we’re talking 45 + $142 billion = $187 billion).

Wells Fargo was considered in prime shape this fall when it bought out troubled Wachovia, and it took money from the TARP — but only under duress.  Now, despite the CEO’s protests that the stress tests are “asinine,” the bank is considered one of the most likely to be under pressure to raise new capital.  Warren Buffet, whose Berkshire Hathaway investment group owns shares of Wells Fargo (and US Bancorp, SunTrust, and BoA) and pushed for the Wachovia takeover, called Wells and US Bancorp “extremely strong banks” Monday.
Current TARP investment: ~$25 billion.

KeyCorp owns the Key Bank franchises.  It’s considered to be widely and heavily exposed in the commerical real-estate market, which is taking some significant hits as businesses suffer during the recession.  Analysts at several research/investment firms have said KeyCorp is quite likely to need to raise additional capital, and it has shown a loss in all of the last four quarters.
Current TARP investment: ~$2.5 billion

Regions Financial is in about the same boat as KeyCorp.  Oppenheimer analysts said late last month that they expected Regions to fail the stress tests and have to raise more capital.  Regions posted a 92% loss in the first quarter.  Holy mackeral.
Current TARP investment: ~$2.5 Billion

US Bancorp owns U.S. Bank, the sixth largest commercial bank in the country.  It’s not widely expected to need a big capital raise; it cut dividends earlier this year by 88 percent to maintain its capital cushion.  Its CEO also announced late last month that US Bancorp is ready to repay its TARP money as soon as possible.  The bank had a $529 million profit in the first quarter, down significantly from past years but a better showing than expected.
Current TARP investment: $6.6 billion

Fifth Third Bancorp is another regional bank expected to need additional capital.  It’s based in Florida, where the burst of the housing bubble is still taking down everything in its path.  Like Regions, were the government to convert its preferred shares to common shares, it would own a majority stake (54 percent) of Fifth Third.  One wonders if that’s enough ownership to induce a name change.
Current TARP investment: $3.4 billion

Like Fifth Third, Georgia-based SunTrust is a considered a regional bank likely to be told to get thee more capital, according to a report issued by Mogan Stanley last month.  Then again, Morgan Stanley though BoA fell into a “grey zone” and might not need new capital, so who knows. SunTrust wrote off $610 million in bad loans just in the first quarter this year, and apparently holds a big balance sheet of home mortgage loans in the Southeast.  Last week, a huge Georgia banker’s bank with similar ugly exposure became the fifth largest bank failure this year.  In January, analysts were already predicting SunTrust would need another $2 billion.  They went back for $1B from TARP, so at this point, I’d guess they’ll need at least $1B.
Current TARP investment: ~$5 billion.

PNC Financial Services Group posted a profit last quarter, mostly on the strength of its acquisition of National City — a move that some say gave the bank a needed capital boost.  Analysts at Keefe, Bruyette and Woods say PNC is likely to need more capital despite cutting dividend payments earlier this year.
Current TARP investment: ~$7.5 billion

And lucky number 10.  Capital One Financial Group is mentioned with some regularity as a bank expected to need additional capital.  Its exposure is largely in credit cards, and as unemployment rises (in the stress tests, it went over 10 percent) so do expected defaults on credit card payments. 
Current TARP exposure: $3.5 billion

Ten banks are expected to have “failed,” or, in the nicer terminology, to need to raise new capital so as to have a nice cushion in case of the economy continuing to decline.  The remaining nine banks are considered variably secure right now, though BB&T is mentioned in several articles as likely to be asked to raise capital, too, and I’m a little surprised that no one thinks GMAC is going to need any further funding.
Current BB&T TARP Investment: ~$3 billion

Current GMAC TARP Investment: $5 billion

The remaining banks (bank holding companies) are:

• J.P. Morgan Chase.  Current TARP Investment: $25 billion
• Goldman Sachs Group.  Current TARP Investment: $10 billion
• Morgan Stanley.  Current TARP Investment: $10 billion
• State Street Corp.  Current TARP Investment: $2 billion
• Bank of New York Mellon.  Current TARP Investment: $3 billion
• American Express Co.  Current TARP Investment: ~$3.4 billion
• MetLife.  No TARP Investment.

Well, so, let’s see what happens now.

Small Wonder: A Terrible Day for Tim Geithner

Felix Salmon had a nice post today suggesting that major U.S. banks holding Chrysler’s debt are willing to let the company go into bankruptcy instead of taking a haircut on their debt in part because there’s no real way the public could think less of them.  Being the automatic villain gives one a certain freedom to be horrible, and J.P. Morgan Chase and friends certainly find themselves there.

What this made me wonder is, at what point will Tim Geithner hit the so-hated-he-can-do-whatever stage?

I mean, this has been a totally sucky week to be Geithner.  Consider he went into the weekend with Paul Krugman’s “it’s gonna get so much worse” column and Rachel Maddow having invited the “Hey Paul Krugman” singer onto her show (for the 5 people who hadn’t already heard him sing, “Timothy Geithner, he’s like some little weasel,” via the Internet).  Yesterday, he had the hey-guys, cut-your-budgets Cabinet meeting (check out the body language here, too — that’s Geithner slumped next to Biden).  At this point, I’m not sure the man could buy friends (though I have no doubt at least one commenter will say he’s tried).  Just take the last 24 hours:

• The Special Inspector General issued his report, which initially made news for saying that, contrary to the Secretary’s earlier assertions, firms who wanted to participate on either side of the Public-Private Investment Partnerships would be subject to compensation limits.
• Then it made news because, at The Economist, that sounds like the end of the PPIP.
• Then it made news because there are already 20 fraud cases being investigated.
• Then Felix Salmon pointed out that, within the report, there’s open speculation that it could encourage out-right criminal organization money-laundering schemes.
• The IMF also released its Global Financial Stability Report today, and said that bank losses are over $4 trillion, with more than half of that originating in the U.S.  Oh, and we’re going to need substantial additional investment to recapitalize banks, and may need to nationalize some at least temporarily.  And soon.
• All of this before the real fun started: Geithner testified before Elizabeth Warren’s Congressional Oversight Panel.  You may remember her as the woman who made Jon Stewart feel better last week, or the one who released the highly critical — and commendable, at that — report on the Treasury’s plans so far.  Wanna guess how that meeting went down?  Let Andrew Leonard summarize:

The pattern is now sufficiently well established to be definitive. The treasury secretary appears before a congressional committee, and is asked tough, detailed questions by members of both parties. He invariably compliments and thanks the questioner for a “thoughtful” and “important” question, and then proceeds to answer in vague generalities, rarely committing himself to specifics.

I’ve watched or pored over the transcripts of almost all of Geithner’s testimony before Congress, and it’s getting harder and harder to make a case in defense of his brief tenure. Tuesday’s hearing, before the Congressional Oversight Panel empowered by Congress to watch over the TARP program, ranks as one of his least satisfying performances so far. 

(I would say it was sort of like watching the robot from Small Wonder face off with Minerva McGonagall from Harry Potter — you start off rooting for both sides, but by the end, you just want McGonagall to put the robot out of her repetitve, wide-eyed misery).

• The stock market did rally a bit over Geithner’s assertion that “the vast majority of banks have more capital than they need to be considered well capitalized by their regulators.”  That sounds like great news, until you realize he never said that (he skipped those pages, somewhat dramatically, in his testimony).
• Also, even if he had said that, it was meaningless and earned, again, bafflement and concern (and use of the word “ominous” in the first paragraph) from Paul Krugman.
• Finally, The Wall Street Journal ran an interview with Geithner (“Geithner Weighs Bank Repayments“) where he said he’s considering whether to let banks repay their TARP debt early or not.
• Finance blogger Nemo and a reader point out that, no, he can’t do that — he has to let banks pay the money back whenever they want to.  Strike… what? 56 or so? for Geithner.

It’s those last two points that bring us to the importance of the villain question.  The two banks currently talking about repayment are Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan Chase.  Paying back TARP funds would free these two from compensation limits — present and looming — and also make them look strong and solvent.  JPMC CEO Jamie Dimon has called TARP assistance a “scarlet letter,” and he’s looking to shed it as quickly as possible.  This would possibly inspire further investment in these banks and certainly encourage concentration of power into their hands.

Which is partly why the Treasury Department isn’t keen on just letting them repay so quickly.  Banks shedding TARP funds could make other banks want to jump ship — banks whose life-vests aren’t properly inflated.  So you could see Bank of America trying to pay back TARP, and either failing after payback, or failing to payback at all — and either way looking so weak as to inspire (who thought it was possible) less confidence than even now.  Which would, of course, benefit those who do survive the leap — probably a big part of the JPMC/Goldman dream right now.

In fact, the only reason that a firm wouldn’t leave TARP right now is a desire NOT to piss off the U.S. Treasury Department.  It’s in their individual interests to run, even while it might be in the interest of the entire system for them to stay a while.  So let me ask you this: Is Tim Geithner someone you’d want mad at you?  Does a real villain lurk somewhere within the Small Wonder facade, just waiting for the day when it no longer matters what Wall Street thinks — and if so, was today that day?  Does he have enough power, inside or out of the Treasury, to make things more uncomfortable for these banks than they already are?

My guess?  If there’s pressure to be brought to bear, it will have to be done by the President — and if that’s the case, Geithner’s days at the grown-up table are going to be limited.

New Treasury Plan: This Ain’t Yo’ Momma’s TARP

Treasury officials are considering a new plan, the New York Times reports, to help banks recapitalize: they’d convert their current loans into common stock in the bank, which would translate to actual equity and, perhaps, the accompanying power that comes with being a shareholder.  This would include some power to decide who stays on the board and, yes, would probably be a big step toward nationalization — all without having to ask Congress for any additional money.

The problem is that, for at least some of these banks, we’d be converting not just loans, as the Times leads with, but preferred stock into common stock.  One stock for another? Paul Krugman was quick to call the plan baffling, and he came up with this analogy:

Here’s how I think about it: you started a business with a bunch of borrowed money, but of course had to put some of your own money in. Now, actually some of the money you put in was borrowed from your mother, but the original lenders don’t care about that, since they have prior claim.

Eventually you run into some business difficulties, and your creditworthiness is in doubt — which in turn is making it hard for you to do business. What you need is evidence of ability to repay the money you already owe.

So does it help if your mother converts her loan into a share of the business? Not really, because she won’t get repaid anyway unless all your other creditors get paid first. So the terms of her agreement with you don’t affect their prospects of payment.

And in this case, the TARP is your mother.

OK.  But I think it actually would help me, as a business, survive — and would certainly increase the confidence lenders had in me — if my mother happened to have a GDP of $14 trillion when she became an official part-owner of my business.

No?

If that seems too cute by far, Felix Salmon likes the new plan, too, and says it in actual econo-speak.  I’ll try and translate, but he’s speaking pretty plain English, too (this is me suggesting you scoot over and read him; he’s very good).  Essentially, whether you like the new suggestion or not depends on how you looked at the original preferred stock plan.  If, like Krugman, you considered preferred stock to come with equity, then this plan makes very little sense — it’s a swap of what we have for what we have, only with increased risk of losing everything.  But Salmon makes the argument that preferred shares didn’t automatically confer ownership in the same way that common stock does, which seems to be generally true of preferred stock.  Preferred stockholders are exactly that — preferred — in the case of bankruptcy.  They (usually) get their money back just after bondholders, and certainly always before common stock holders.  In exchange, preferred stock usually doesn’t come with voting rights, and isn’t usually as profitable in the long term as common stock.

The glass-half-empty way to look at this is that, if any of the nation’s 19 largest banks go under, we’re trading stock that would have guaranteed us at least some of our money back for stock where we could very well and easily lose everything.

Glass half full?  We’re trading stock that gave us no say-so for stock that lets us start cleaning house, at least in a few places, and if we really get the house cleaned, we have a better chance of turning a profit.

I’ll just be over here drinking the rest of the glass.  Now that TARP is my mother, I assume my inheritance is going to be huge.