Fiat’s Chrysler Buy: Just the Ideas, Ma’am

Here’s the question that matters this week: If you had $14,000, would you buy this car?

It’s the Fiat 500, and the concept most likely to be coming soon to a Chrysler plant near you, should the Fiat/Chrysler merger come together.  Sergio Marchionne, Fiat’s CEO, has been saying since last year that he’d like to bring the 500 to the American market.  And Chrysler’s been encouraged by the government to produce smaller, more fuel-efficient cars pronto.  The 500, which would fit in my car’s trunk, gets 46 miles to the gallon on its base model (a more eco-friendly version gets 67 mpg, with carbon emissions nearly equal to a Smart car).  Did I mention it currently goes for 10,500 euro ($14,000)?

The 500 and its Fiat brethren (The Fiat Panda seems a likely companion, but only for people who never listen to Top Gear’s Jeremy Clarkson) are the future of Chrysler.  They are, in fact, what Fiat is “buying” into Chrysler with — the company is offering no money at all to take a 20 percent stake in the company.  Instead, they’re offering concepts and techonology — $10 billion worth.

It’s probably a good deal.  The government viability report [.pdf] on Chrysler mentioned again and again that the company was, basically, out of ideas.  It spent everything it had to keep pace with its larger competitors, putting everything it had into production, so that it had cut back sadly and deeply on research and development.  The merger will offer Chrysler a way back into the new-car market, putting its plants to work on constructing cars based on Fiat-researched models.  What we’ll get won’t be the 500 — Ford took that name already — but a twist on it, a Fiat with the familiar Chrysler wings on front.  Sounds like a happy ending, right?

Except what we’ve come to is that an Italian company is going to buy an American car-maker not on the strength of its money, but on the value of its ideas.  In that respect, it’s hard to think of Fiat as the savior of the American manufacturing industry.  If innovation is the problem, well, it’s hard to think of a way to save the industry at all.

New Treasury Plan: This Ain’t Yo’ Momma’s TARP

Treasury officials are considering a new plan, the New York Times reports, to help banks recapitalize: they’d convert their current loans into common stock in the bank, which would translate to actual equity and, perhaps, the accompanying power that comes with being a shareholder.  This would include some power to decide who stays on the board and, yes, would probably be a big step toward nationalization — all without having to ask Congress for any additional money.

The problem is that, for at least some of these banks, we’d be converting not just loans, as the Times leads with, but preferred stock into common stock.  One stock for another? Paul Krugman was quick to call the plan baffling, and he came up with this analogy:

Here’s how I think about it: you started a business with a bunch of borrowed money, but of course had to put some of your own money in. Now, actually some of the money you put in was borrowed from your mother, but the original lenders don’t care about that, since they have prior claim.

Eventually you run into some business difficulties, and your creditworthiness is in doubt — which in turn is making it hard for you to do business. What you need is evidence of ability to repay the money you already owe.

So does it help if your mother converts her loan into a share of the business? Not really, because she won’t get repaid anyway unless all your other creditors get paid first. So the terms of her agreement with you don’t affect their prospects of payment.

And in this case, the TARP is your mother.

OK.  But I think it actually would help me, as a business, survive — and would certainly increase the confidence lenders had in me — if my mother happened to have a GDP of $14 trillion when she became an official part-owner of my business.

No?

If that seems too cute by far, Felix Salmon likes the new plan, too, and says it in actual econo-speak.  I’ll try and translate, but he’s speaking pretty plain English, too (this is me suggesting you scoot over and read him; he’s very good).  Essentially, whether you like the new suggestion or not depends on how you looked at the original preferred stock plan.  If, like Krugman, you considered preferred stock to come with equity, then this plan makes very little sense — it’s a swap of what we have for what we have, only with increased risk of losing everything.  But Salmon makes the argument that preferred shares didn’t automatically confer ownership in the same way that common stock does, which seems to be generally true of preferred stock.  Preferred stockholders are exactly that — preferred — in the case of bankruptcy.  They (usually) get their money back just after bondholders, and certainly always before common stock holders.  In exchange, preferred stock usually doesn’t come with voting rights, and isn’t usually as profitable in the long term as common stock.

The glass-half-empty way to look at this is that, if any of the nation’s 19 largest banks go under, we’re trading stock that would have guaranteed us at least some of our money back for stock where we could very well and easily lose everything.

Glass half full?  We’re trading stock that gave us no say-so for stock that lets us start cleaning house, at least in a few places, and if we really get the house cleaned, we have a better chance of turning a profit.

I’ll just be over here drinking the rest of the glass.  Now that TARP is my mother, I assume my inheritance is going to be huge.