Friends Don’t Let Friends Drive Toxic Assets

The Legacy Loans program, a sizable chunk of the Geithner Plan, is dead, reports the New York Times.  The FDIC has “called off plans to start a $1 billion pilot program this month that was intended to help banks clean up their balance sheets.”

I’ve used my car before to explain this program, so maybe I can use it to explain the death.  In this scenario, the role of the Bad Bank is played by me; the Toxic Asset is my car; and Tim Geithner and Sheila Bair, Treasury Secretary and FDIC chair respectively, play themselves. 

^{By CatKaoe}

Remember, if you will, that in our last scenario, my accountant, Tim, had offered to partner with his friend Sheila to offer potential buyers of my car a pretty sweet deal: Sheila would loan 80 percent of the money to any potential buyer, and Tim would invest up to half of the remaining cost of the purchase, which meant someone could buy my car for about 10 percent of its auction price.  That would give me extra money to spend in the economy (hooray!).  It would also allow the dealer that bought my lemon the chance to fix it up and hold onto it until the market for bad cars goes back up.  Win-win, with the possibility of Tim and Sheila taking a big hit (taxpayer lose).

But what’s happened since this initial offer is that I, holder of the toxic car, have fallen back in love with it.  That burning oil smell — it’s the scent of nostalgia, of summers spent on hot tar highways.  The scratches and dents merely make the car more hip, like a worn pair of jeans.  I’m starting to think I could convert it to bio-diesel.  In short, I’m no longer willing to sell for anything less than the original $1,000 I thought it was worth.  I am not willing to put it up for auction, as Tim said I had to do.

Now, maybe I’m being honest about that.  Maybe I really do think the car’s gonna make it.  But maybe I don’t want to put the car up for auction because last month, I applied for a new apartment, and as part of my credit check I listed the car as an asset when I did that — an asset worth $1,000.  Now, I don’t want to put the car up for auction, because it will become clear pretty quickly that the car is only worth $700, and I could lose my apartment. 

Or maybe I don’t want to sell the car because I no longer need to sell it.  The market’s getting a little better, I’m feeling more flush, and I think I can afford to pay to maintain it until the time comes when it will be worth what I’m willing to sell it for.  It will be vintage soon, you know?

Now, Tim and Sheila — Tim in particular — have an interest in making sure I’m telling the truth about my motivation.  Because if I’m not selling because selling will make me look insolvent, well — that means I’m already insolvent.  If I’m not selling because I’m ready to spend, spend, spend anyway, then that means the market is improving, and the healing has begun (and quick, Tim says, let’s get some posters printed about that one, and make sure we send one to Paul Krugman).

Ezra Klein outlined both of these reasons as why the banks might not be willing to jump into the Geithner plan.  Kevin Drum at Mother Jones says it’s probably the insolvency problem, and that’s really, really bad, because it means that not only did the Geithner plan not solve the banks’ problems, but the banks are being allowed — and maybe, post-stress test, encouraged — to live on in denial that will eventually come back to bite us all.

To extend the metaphor: there exists a danger to the community if I continue to drive around a broken car while swearing that really, it’s fine.  Not only am I not spending as much as I could be, since I’m constantly worried about my toxic asset, but I might be actively making the whole community less safe by showing them that it’s cool to keep broken cars.

I think there’s also a third option, here.  Banks might be deluding themselves; they might be healthy enough to afford hanging onto their loans; and they might actually be afraid to deal with the government.  Several banks, post-stress test, raised a bunch of capital in advance of leaving TARP.  If they get re-entangled with the Geithner Plan now, they’ll also get pulled back into the shady land of government regulation over compensation.

In short: am I unwilling to sell the car because I still love it, because I still need it, or because you’re not the boss of me, Tim Geithner?

It could be all three (and none of these are particularly good reasons, really).  But whatever it is, I hope there’s a plan B.  I hope Tim and Sheila and Ben Bernanke have a better idea of what to do next than just what Sheila Bair said they’re going to do, which is wait and see if the PPIP might be needed later.  That’s only an OK plan if the assets don’t get worse — and I am not at all encouraged by our jobless rates, the rise in foreclosure and bankruptcy claims, and the continued need of companies with terrible mortgages on their books (yesterday GMAC got another $7.5 billion).

At some point, Friends Don’t Let Friends Drive Toxic Assets.  Apparently the banks still want to keep the keys — but at some point, Tim, Sheila, or Ben might have to step up and say, no way, man.  The PPIP was the gentlest possible way of doing that, so I’m sorry to see it die.

^{By wireheadinc / CC license}

The New G.M.: A Green G.M.?

So, G.M. is going into bankruptcy, and the government’s going to own a big slice. Yep.  Please raise your hand if you’re surprised.  OK, seeing no hands up, let’s move on to what’s really interesting here: who exactly is going to be running G.M.

I think the answer lies in the video above.  No, not just in the president’s remarks, where he says that he won’t be making the decisions — in the people who are in attendance at the remarks.  Namely, in his auto task force.

So who are all these people standing with him?  Well, from left to right, I spot:

Christina Romer, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers
Stephen Chu, Secretary of Energy
Hilda Solis, Secretary of Labor
Barack Obama — what’s that guy do?
Gary Locke, Secretary of Commerce
Ray LaHood, Secretary of Transportation and Natty Handkerchiefs
Peter Orszag, OMB Director

Next row:
Austan Goolsbee, member of the Council of Economic Advisers
Larry Summers, director of the National Economic Council
Carol Browner, assistant to the president for Energy and Climate Change
The Mayor from Spin City Jared Bernstein, Economic Adviser to VP Joe Biden

Back row:
Ron Bloom, senior adviser at Treasury
Gene Sperling, counselor to Geithner and member of the CEA
Ed Montgomery, Director of Recovery for Auto Communities and Workers
Steven Rattner, who I believe to be the Car Czar and possibly also the Worst Tie Picker in history

Not pictured: Tim Geithner, who’s in China, and about six other second-tier members of the auto task force, including the 31 year old that the New York Times seems to think is running this show, Brian Deese.  I guess there’s only so many people you can fit in the Grand Foyer.

Image means a lot in Washington.  Obama may be saying, today, that the government is going to keep its nose out of the new G.M., but we’re still a few months away from that new entity, and everyone standing behind him will have a say in what it looks like.

So what I’m most interested in here is that two people — Chu and Browner — are present from the energy/environment side.  The way the administration has tied the success of the automotive industry to the cause of the environment is kind of fascinating.  Chrysler is being pushed toward smaller, more eco-friendly models, and now it seems inevitable that G.M. will be pushed that way, too.  These people — this task force — is built to do exactly that.

In case you’re wondering, as I did, who President Bush brought out with him when he announced the auto bailout, here’s the answer:

Bush stood alone and couched his discussion of the loans in almost completely business terms.  He made no mention of the companies changing to fuel efficient models or of any goal to achieve energy independence, as Obama did in his speech.

I kind of like the new crowd.

Could a Blog have Saved Edmund Andrews from Foreclosure?

About two weeks ago, the New York Times ran an excerpt from Edmund Andrews’s forthcoming book, Busted: Life Inside the Great Mortgage Meltdown.  I wasn’t alone in saying it would be the weekend’s must-read; Andrews’s tale of how he, a successful business writer for the Times, and his new wife were facing foreclosure makes for a fascinating read.  It’s a very personal story:

^{Image by: Respres (Flickr)}

The panic attack hit me around 2 a.m. on Patty’s birthday. It was Oct. 17, 2007, and I was lying in bed obsessing over bills that couldn’t be postponed and the money we didn’t have to pay them. Like many of my predawn fear cascades, this one had its start with a specific unpaid bill: $240 in traffic tickets — $140 for speeding, $50 each for expired tags and inspection. The fines would double if we didn’t pay them in less than a week. The tickets had uncorked the bottle on all the other “must pays”: the $400 electric bill with the cutoff date printed in red; the $220 cable/telephone/Internet bill for the past two months; the MasterCard and American Express bills — at least one of which had to be brought current or I wouldn’t even be able to travel for work. And of course, there was the $3,271 mortgage payment.

After its publication, Megan McArdle at The Atlantic found that Andrews neglected to mention in his piece or his book that his new wife filed for bankruptcy just after they first married — and had also filed once before, during her first marriage, making her not exactly the kind of good-credit help-mate that one might think she is from Andrews’s descriptions.  McArdle:

Andrews’ desire to shield his wife is understandable–hell, laudable.  No decent person wants to parade their spouse’s financial trouble in front of the world.  But this is material information that changes the tenor of his story.  Serial bankruptcy is not a creation of the current credit crisis, and it doesn’t just happen to anyone, particularly anyone with a six figure salary.

While I agree with her conclusions, I also agree with Andrews’s response that it’s not terribly material to the story he was trying to tell, about the ease with which he — clearly unqualified — got massive loans and credit he couldn’t afford.

But what I find even more interesting was a piece McArdle wrote that same morning, about Credit Reports and whether black marks “have staying power.”  She writes:

On the other hand, I can attest from personal experience that those smudges have staying power.  Through a series of bizarre events including a misfiled state tax return, multi-state residence, and an apparently incorrect address, the state of New York slapped me with a tax lien a few years back.  The State of New York has since admitted they were entirely in error, and indeed, that they owed me about $500 in refund.

(Not that they paid.   Funnily enough, the statute of limitations for getting a refund from the state is much shorter than their statute of limitations for coming after arrears.)

Megan McArdle is the Business and Economics Editor for The Atlantic, as well as one of its leading business bloggers.  Just in replying to the day’s news, above, she brought in her own personal experience — instant connect between what’s happened to her and what’s happening in the world.

Edmund Andrews, as an economics reporter for the NYT, says, “I have been the paper’s chief eyes and ears on the Federal Reserve for the past six years.”  Yet Andrews was able to disconnect himself so completely from what he was writing about that he fell into a terrible trap despite being so well informed.

If in 2004, Edmund Andrews had been blogging for DealBook at the Times in addition to supplying objective reports on the “spike in go-go mortgages,” maybe he would have been forced to realize what was coming for him.  Maybe one day he would have posted, “My wife and I are thinking about buying a $500,000 house –” and would have had to stop right there, hit in print by the impossibility of that ever working out.  And, I guarantee, if just writing it wasn’t enough to shake him into reality, the fiery comments that would have followed would have offered at least 75 persuasive descriptions of what he could do with that idea.

This thing we do, blogging — it’s in first person for a reason.  To do it well requires an amount of honesty that often leads to self-awareness, whether through realization or through readers forcing it upon you.

I’m continually bothered by the way that we cheer for distance between reporters and what they report on.  I understand the desire for objectivity, but not the belief that it’s possible.

G.M., Chrysler Announce Thousands of Dealership Cuts

It hasn’t been a good year for car dealerships.  Gas prices skyrocketed, meaning more people were eyeing the bus and the bike; the economy downshifted, meaning more people were eyeing the electrical tape than the new-car circulars; and now two of the Big Three U.S. automakers have announced plans to cut a combined 3,158 dealerships in the next year or so.

G.M. made its announcement today.  The company plans to cut its network of dealerships by 2,369 (40 percent) by 2010.  These cuts will come from cutting off 1,100 dealerships that underperform, closing 500 dealerships that only sell the Pontiac, Saab, Hummer, and Saturn lines that G.M. is looking to get rid of, and by combining other franchises.  Right now, G.M. says this will happen in late 2010, when contracts expire, but if it files for bankruptcy, the closures might move up significantly — say, to this fall.  They haven’t yet announced which dealerships will close, but have said they’re focusing on underperformers, a logical way to make cuts.

Chrysler made its announcement yesterday, complete with a list of who’s going to close, where.  They’ve asked the court to cut off these contracts on June 9.  You can download the full bankruptcy filing [huge .pdf] and search for your home state, if you’re curious (I was). 

What you might find is that some dealerships aren’t closing outright — they’re just losing the Chrysler side of their business, as the Jeep-Volvo-Volkswagon dealer near me will be.  That’s still a big hit in product supply, of course, but the reports that say unambiguously that 3,000 dealerships are going out of business seem to miss the nuance: 3,000 dealerships will lose supply of brand-new G.M. and Chrysler vehicles, but the industry is so cross-pollinated now that it doesn’t automatically mean 3,000 dealerships will fold.  It will be a huge loss for these businesses, which will also (presumably) lose financing arrangements through GMAC, but it’s not the end of the road for every one.

Yet G.M. in particular seems to be ready to cut off its smallest dealerships, those that sell only a few dozen cars a year and are probably likely to be heavily tied to one brand.  While that makes perfect business sense, I wonder if won’t also contribute to the declining economy in the middle of the country, where, like the slogan says at one my old hometown car-dealerships, “a handshake is still a deal.”  Small dealerships are everywhere in the Midwest, and while they do a fair trade in used cars, there’s still a culture of The Car Dealer, the small town salesman who can talk you into a new Cadillac when you came in for a tire rotation, that seems sure to die.

Trust Fund, Baby: Paris Hilton and Social Security

Today, the Obama administration’s official Bearers of Bad News, fresh off the fun of Swine Flu and Stress Tests, announced that Social Security will deplete its trust fund by 2037, four years earlier than expected.  Scarier than that, in 2017 — just eight years from now — Medicare’s hospital insurance trust fund will run out of money.  That’s the fund that pays for inpatient hospital services, home health, skilled nursing facilities, and hospice care for those over 65.  So, not anything millions of seniors depend on or anything.

^{Glenn Francis/PacificProDigital.com}

Government trust funds are the same as “regular” trust funds.  They represent a surplus of income from one party that’s designed to support the life of another party.  So, either great-grandpa struck it rich in the hotel business, in which case you start drawing down your ~$30 million trust fund at 18, or great-grandpa paid payroll taxes every month, in which case a trust fund built from that contribution lets Social Security and Medicare provide services after age 65.

When a trust fund runs out for a big government program, it’s the same as when it runs out for a spoiled rich kid.  You aren’t instantly broke or on the street, and 2037 will likely be the end of neither Social Security nor Paris Hilton.  Money will still come in, but expenditures will be limited to income and to what other people will loan out.  So Social Security will still be getting tax income when it runs out of trust fund money, but not enough to cover the number of people expected to be drawing SS in 2037, just as a sudden depletion of available trust fundery (estimated at between $1-$4 million a year) would probably reduce the benefits available in life to Paris Hilton. 

Ms. Hilton could probably make up for the lost income by living on her AmEx Black for a while, just like Medicare and Social Security could probably live on government debt for a while — but eventually everyone reaches a limit.  Membership has only so many priviledges.

The government has the same options that Paris Hilton does to treat a shortfall: Raise revenue or reduce benefits.  Here’s the finding of the Doomsday Club:

The Medicare Report shows that the HI Trust Fund could be brought into actuarial balance over the next 75 years by changes equivalent to an immediate 134 percent increase in the payroll tax (from a rate of 2.9 percent to 6.78 percent), or an immediate 53 percent reduction in program outlays, or some combination of the two. Larger changes would be required to make the program solvent beyond the 75-year horizon.

[…]

Social Security could be brought into actuarial balance over the next 75 years with changes equivalent to an immediate 16 percent increase in the payroll tax (from a rate of 12.4 percent to 14.4 percent) or an immediate reduction in benefits of 13 percent or some combination of the two. Ensuring that the system remains solvent on a sustainable basis beyond the next 75 years would require larger changes because increasing longevity will result in people receiving benefits for ever longer periods of retirement.

A 53 percent cut in benefits for Medicare.  It’s much easier to say that Ms. Hilton should spend less at Hermès than it is to tell seniors that they should consider skipping six months’ worth of medications, or a necessary surgery or, you know, food.  So the government’s solution will be the same as Ms. Hilton’s, most likely: Raise revenue.  While it’d be nice if the government could make money simply by showing up at a club, right now the only way it’s going to get that money is through an increase on taxes.

Now, who is it that has to say yes to raising taxes?  Oh yeah: Congress.  If John Boehner’s late-April op-ed in the Washington Times is right, I’d say right now there’s about the same chance of a tax increase being passed by the Senate as there is of Paris Hilton being elected to the Senate.  Actually, her chances may be higher.  Stranger things have happened in California.

Really, this is an issue that has to go before Congress, and predictions are some kind of Medicare fix will hit the deck this year or next.  I can’t imagine anyone voting to cut Medicare benefits by half, but five years ago I couldn’t imagine anyone giving George W. Bush a second term.

So perhaps it’s time to look into a government reality show franchise, before all of our seniors are living very, very simple lives.

Take GMAC Down

The big news, really, is that GMAC needs $11.5 billion (and will need $4 billion more if it takes on Chrylser financing).  Can you think of anyone who would loan GMAC $11.50 right now, not to mention $11.5 billion?  Who should they even ask?  Well, I can think of one guy.  Can you guess?

OK, him too, but I’m not allowed to blog about Tim Geithner anymore, am I?  Keep guessing.

Getting warmer, but who knows if he’ll be able to stay awake long enough to count out the money (which, yes, he might have on hand). 

You don’t even know who that is, do you?  It’s OK; you’re not alone.  Hint: It’s Gary Locke.  He’s the Commerce Secretary.

Give up?  The auto task force guy with the power of the purse on this one might actually be this guy:

That’s Steven Rattner, the Car Czar.  Not really sure why he’s so far in the back during this Shame on You Chrysler Lenders speech, since he’s apparently the guy who fired Rick Wagoner at G.M. and heavily rumored to be the guy who told Chrysler’s non-complying creditors the White House would destroy them if they didn’t cooperate.  (He’s also, according to that first link, the guy who’s eyeing Tim Geithner’s parking space at Treasury — or at least was before his own possible scandal popped up).  Rattner is also the guy who will be poring over G.M.’s you-have-60-days-to-get-it-together filing, which is due at the end of this month.

Also due 30 days from now (June 8, to be precise)?  A plan from each of the banks listed above that needs to raise capital about how, exactly, those banks plan to raise that needed capital by November. I’m guessing GMAC’s plan can be summed up in two words: Government bailout.

So my thought is this: How can GMAC make any kind of plan without including the viability of GM (and Chrsyler, for which it might be taking up sales financing for) in its plan?  And if it includes those pieces of the puzzle, doesn’t that make Rattner the point man?

This seems like a good thing. Rattner’s the one who spear-headed the Chrysler effort, which ended, you may remember, with not much government concession to bondholders.  Rattner has shown that he’s willing to see a car company fail.  It can’t be that hard for GMAC to imagine that he wouldn’t mind watching a car company’s finance wing fail, too.

And though Treasury has said that they will support GMAC as needed, I’d guess that’s a reassurance meant more for its counterparties than for GMAC itself.  This is a bank that probably needs to go into receivership.  It’s a bank that, as Floyd Norris writes, “concluded, disastrously, that a good way to offset possible losses on auto loans was to get into mortgage lending.”  Going forward, what are the prospects for GMAC to revive?

I’m not convinced that a GMAC failure would be the same systemic threat that a failure of Citi or BoA might be.  First, I don’t think it would send a confidence shock through the system if GMAC went down — in fact, I think it’s more shocking that it’s being allowed to stand.

Second, GMAC does provide financing for dealerships to buy new inventory, and then provides financing for customers to buy that inventory — but if a contraction in that particular market is going to happen anyway (and it certainly seems it will, as part of Chrysler’s bankruptcy deal will include dealership closings), why not just hand GMAC off to the FDIC now?  Why not call this bank, and all of its attached pieces, a failure?

If anyone’s going to have a come-to-Jesus meeting with this bank, Steven Rattner seems like the guy to do it.  He’s probably got the clearest picture of GM’s predicament right now, and I hope that qualifies him to deal with their semi-detached financing arm, too.

Stress Testes of Steel

I cannot explain how much I love that headline, and how hard I’m going to work to make it relevant.  So the stress test results [.pdf] came out yesterday, and revealed that, while none of the banks are currently considered insolvent, several of them could go that way if the government’s “more adverse” scenario of unemployment hitting 10.3% comes to pass.  So they’re asking 11 bank-holding companies to raise capital to meet their preferred “cushion” level.  Here’s the summary of who needs what, in billions, as per the Wall Street Journal’s colorful front page:

Bank of America: $33.9
Wells Fargo: $13.7
Citigroup: $5.5
GMAC: $11.5
Regions Financial: $2.5
SunTrust: $2.2
KeyCorp: $1.8
Fifth Third: $1.1
PNC Financia: $l .6
Morgan Stanley: $1.8
J.P. Morgan Chase, BB&T, Capital One, US Bancorp, MetLife, Goldman Sachs, Bank of NY Mellon, American Express, and State Street: $0
Having six months to raise new, private capital: Priceless.

Let me highlight the surprises:

• Wells Fargo needs quite a bit of funding to be adequately cushioned against any further decline in the economy.  The predictions for Wells are already being called overly optimistic by some, because Wells — like several of the passing institutions — is heavily invested in real estate that may go further south than the government’s prediction.  
• Capital One is not on the needy list — let’s hope credit card defaults don’t surpass the government’s more adverse scenario numbers (18-20% losses).
• The Citi number seems low — until you realize that they need to raise $5.5 billion IN ADDITION to the $45 billion from the government that they just converted to common stock and the $3.4 billion it just sold Nikko for.  So put them down for $50 billion and change.
• GMAC suuuuucks.  I’ve got another post on that one coming later, though.

So, what do you do, the day after the government tells everyone that you aren’t sufficiently capitalized to survive a 1.4 percent rise in unemployment?  If you’re Wells Fargo and Morgan Stanley, well, you use that encouraging news to raise $7.5 billion each today:

In the capital-raising exercises, Wells Fargo sold $7.5 billion of common stock; regulators had ruled it needs to fill a capital hole of $13.7 billion.

Morgan Stanley raised $8 billion by selling $4 billion in common stock and $4 billion in bonds. It increased the total amount it raised compared with its initial plans by $3 billion because of strong investor demand, it said. Regulators had declared that the investment bank needed to raise money to fill a $1.8 billion hole.

Here’s my question — who bought those public offerings?  Friends of Bernie Madoff?  The Morgan Stanley results show that 45% of their expected loan losses are in Commercial Real Estate Loans, a category in which we aren’t even close to the bottom of the market — but their overall.  They did, however, manage to raise $6.5 billion last quarter, and their overall exposure to bad parts of the market is much slimmer than most.

But how bad did people think this was going to be that the news that Wells Fargo’s adverse-case-scenario losses will be $89.6 billion made Wall Street happy?  Shares were up 3.4 today (13.8 percent) on the news.  What?

I’m glad that there’s private capital to be found to shore up these banks, because it does mean that less government money will be needed.  But the sheer, amazing balls of these guys, to use a report of “it’s not as bad as we thought!” to raise billions of dollars — it certainly reminds us that nothing’s really changed on Wall Street in terms of risky behavior.

New York Fed Chair Stephen Friedman Resigns: About Time

The chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve of New York, Stephen Friedman, resigned today — a resignation doubtlessly timed to coincide with the much bigger news of the day, the release of the stress test results.  (I’ll get back to those in a bit).  Though he had earlier announced his intention to resign at the end of the year, he moved the date up as criticisms of his overlapping role at the Fed and on the board of Goldman Sachs have mounted.

The Wall Street Journal ran an A-1 story this week that started thus:

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York shaped Washington’s response to the financial crisis late last year, which buoyed Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and other Wall Street firms. Goldman received speedy approval to become a bank holding company in September and a $10 billion capital injection soon after.

During that time, the New York Fed’s chairman, Stephen Friedman, sat on Goldman’s board and had a large holding in Goldman stock, which because of Goldman’s new status as a bank holding company was a violation of Federal Reserve policy.

The New York Fed asked for a waiver, which, after about 2½ months, the Fed granted. While it was weighing the request, Mr. Friedman bought 37,300 more Goldman shares in December. They’ve since risen $1.7 million in value.

Mr. Friedman also was overseeing the search for a new president of the New York Fed, an officer who has a critical role in setting monetary policy at the Federal Reserve. The choice was a former Goldman executive.

The WSJ has been putting up new pieces every day as criticism of Friedman’s moves has mounted.  He’s not a bad target.  He’s purchased more than 50,000 new shares in Goldman since the bank came under Fed regulation last fall, and never mentioned any of those purchases to the NYFed.  His claims that he saw “no conflict whatsoever in owning shares” is at best self-deluding and more likely disingenuous.  Whether or not Friedman was involved in day-to-day decision making at the Fed — and his spear-heading of the search for a new president certainly makes him seem very involved — as a Class C director, appointed to represent the public, holding shares in any bank or bank holding company seems like a dangerous contradiction.

Now, it’s true that Friedman wasn’t initially in conflict with Fed policy — only when Goldman became a bank-holding company, instead of an investment bank, did he come into explicit conflict with the rules, and at that point the NYFed lawyers sought a waiver.  In January, they concluded he hadn’t broken any internal rules — and even in the statement released by the NYFed, the general counsel says “these purchases did not violate any Federal Reserve statute, rule or policy.”

Which makes it seem all the more important that those statutes, rules, and policies get changed. 

Though Friedman showed some terrible judgment here, the other villain of this story is whoever in the Washington, D.C. Fed offices decided to grant the waiver that allowed Friedman to continue in his conflicting role.  The defense that the NYFed has mustered so far for keeping Friedman around is that his leadership was necessary because the NYFed was already functioning without a president, after Tim Geithner became the Treasury nominee in November.  If that was true — if Friedman was so valuable to the company — then the company should have worked harder to convince Friedman to sell of his shares and resign from Goldman.  Instead, they chose to grant a waiver to a rule that, really, is a pretty reasonable rule, one that’s built to arm against exactly the kinds of conflicted decisions that seem to have been made here.

The WSJ reports that many of the other 11 regional Fed banks already have or are supportive of changing and clarifying the rules.  I hope that’s true.  Until then, it falls upon the Wall Street Journals of the world to find this stuff out and push for change — and we may be destined to see the resolution of the problem coming, as it did in this case, too late.

WSJ: Chrysler Heads to Bankruptcy, Or Fiat, Or Not, Or…?

The Wall Street Journal has a rambling piece about the possible future of Chrysler that starts with this:

Chrysler LLC is preparing to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as soon as next week, whether or not it reaches a deal with its lenders or forges an alliance with Fiat SpA, said several people familiar with the matter.

This sentence kicks off an 1,100 word article in which only three words — “in its totality,” in the last line — are attributed to anyone by name.  The rest of the article quotes:

• “these people” (x4)
• “people familiar with the matters”
• “people familiar with the matter” (again)
• “Fiat” (no clarification on whether that’s the whole company, the signage out front, or someone’s talking car)
• “The Obama administration” (again, no clarification on whether they spoke united)
• “an administration official”
• “one person”
• “people familiar with the situation” (x2)
• “Obama advisers”
• “Officials with President Barack Obama’s auto task force”
• “people familiar with the talks”

That final quote from Fiat CEO Sergio Marchionne came from a conference call.

From this combination, it’s hard to figure out whether there’s any original reporting at all in this story.  It’s also hard to tell what qualifies one to be a person familiar with the situation — let’s hope it requires more than just reading WSJ coverage every day.

The point the story starts out making — that Chrysler is going into bankruptcy even if it cuts a deal with its lenders — is seriously undercut by anonymous quotes within.  We start with the above lede, then travel to someone in the administration and an unnamed Fiat negotiator saying that bankruptcy won’t be necessary, travel to a Chrysler source saying to lenders (via some third party source) that yes, they’re going into bankruptcy so Fiat can pick and choose pieces of Chryster, then finally land on Marchionne’s quote that Fiat is “interested in Chrysler ‘in its totality.'”  In the middle, there’s a side-show story about Fiat seeking a possible merger with G.M. — and the story says both that this will be only a takeover of G.M. European Opel division and a way for Fiat to spread into the American market.

I should not be more confused at the end of the story than I am at the beginning — unless the point of the story is to show the chaos that’s currently reigning within automaker negotiations.  What I get a sense of here instead is the chaos in the newsroom of a paper that sees itself as the premiere source of business news in the country.  Really, it took five reporters to write this?

A friend on OS asked a while back why there aren’t any embeds in the financial crisis — people on the ground, covering the story from within, sending reports back from the front lines.  I spent some time trying to answer this, and kept coming back to the same problem: Embedding a reporter in a bank — in any private enterprise — would seem to be a breach of privacy.  At best, even assuming a reporter did get internal access to the major goings-on, I figured we’d end up with some Bob Woodward-like book on the financial crisis a year after things are concluded, revealing who made who do what and for how much (read that in any way you want — I assume it’s all very messy in the banking industry right now).

But while real-time insider reporting might not be feasible, actual reporting is necessary.  As I rarely spend a day making any calls myself, I’m lecturing from a glass podium on a stage made of very thin crystal — but I’m an unpaid opinion writer, whereas the five reporters who contributed to this Wall Street Journal article about what could be one of the more important financial incidents in a year that hasn’t yet been boring get paid to go out and report the news.  That means not just talking to sources, but getting them to go on the record — and when they won’t go on the record, it means finding more sources who will.  It means telling a story that makes sense, and that’s credible, and that can be tracked and proven.

It also means reporting without a pre-set agenda.  Consider these three paragraphs:

Reorganizing three auto makers on three continents could move the world-wide car industry a big step toward the kind of large-scale consolidation that long has been overdue. For years, auto makers have struggled with excess capacity that has fostered intense price competition and squeezed profits.

The problem has festered because stronger car makers have steadily added plants while governments often have stepped in to prop up ailing car companies to preserve jobs.

Any bid to restructure three auto makers is likely to prove highly complex and risky for the companies involved and the Obama administration. Chrysler is in such bad shape precisely because its cross-border merger with Daimler AG ended in failure after eight years.

That may all be true, but I have no idea who’s claiming it.  Who says consolidation is long overdue?  The reporters?  Half of the reporters?  An unnamed source?  The Wall Street Journal itself?

Hundreds of experts exist in the U.S. who would have been willing to assist in this story, even on a Thursday when there’s good new T.V. to watch.  Likewise, though perhaps no one directly involved with the ongoing negotiations might be willing to go on the record, official sources at all of the companies involved get paid to answer media inquiries, and I bet even their non-denial denials of the statements above would have told us something.

Beyond even that, every time the government thinks about making a deal, a tree dies.  There’s paper out there.  Someone must have been willing to hand over a report or a sketch of where things could be headed.  Someone must be already working on the court filing for Chrysler.

I agree whole-heartedly with Glenn Greenwald that anonymity is being granted all too often these days, and I think we’re in more danger of being complacent about it when it appears in an article full of numbers and semi-familiar economic arguments.  The more complex the argument, the more carefully it should be explained.  The more controversial the event, the higher the bar for granting anonymity.

The more I read of the Wall Street Journal, the more frustrated I get.