G.M., Chrysler Announce Thousands of Dealership Cuts

It hasn’t been a good year for car dealerships.  Gas prices skyrocketed, meaning more people were eyeing the bus and the bike; the economy downshifted, meaning more people were eyeing the electrical tape than the new-car circulars; and now two of the Big Three U.S. automakers have announced plans to cut a combined 3,158 dealerships in the next year or so.

G.M. made its announcement today.  The company plans to cut its network of dealerships by 2,369 (40 percent) by 2010.  These cuts will come from cutting off 1,100 dealerships that underperform, closing 500 dealerships that only sell the Pontiac, Saab, Hummer, and Saturn lines that G.M. is looking to get rid of, and by combining other franchises.  Right now, G.M. says this will happen in late 2010, when contracts expire, but if it files for bankruptcy, the closures might move up significantly — say, to this fall.  They haven’t yet announced which dealerships will close, but have said they’re focusing on underperformers, a logical way to make cuts.

Chrysler made its announcement yesterday, complete with a list of who’s going to close, where.  They’ve asked the court to cut off these contracts on June 9.  You can download the full bankruptcy filing [huge .pdf] and search for your home state, if you’re curious (I was). 

What you might find is that some dealerships aren’t closing outright — they’re just losing the Chrysler side of their business, as the Jeep-Volvo-Volkswagon dealer near me will be.  That’s still a big hit in product supply, of course, but the reports that say unambiguously that 3,000 dealerships are going out of business seem to miss the nuance: 3,000 dealerships will lose supply of brand-new G.M. and Chrysler vehicles, but the industry is so cross-pollinated now that it doesn’t automatically mean 3,000 dealerships will fold.  It will be a huge loss for these businesses, which will also (presumably) lose financing arrangements through GMAC, but it’s not the end of the road for every one.

Yet G.M. in particular seems to be ready to cut off its smallest dealerships, those that sell only a few dozen cars a year and are probably likely to be heavily tied to one brand.  While that makes perfect business sense, I wonder if won’t also contribute to the declining economy in the middle of the country, where, like the slogan says at one my old hometown car-dealerships, “a handshake is still a deal.”  Small dealerships are everywhere in the Midwest, and while they do a fair trade in used cars, there’s still a culture of The Car Dealer, the small town salesman who can talk you into a new Cadillac when you came in for a tire rotation, that seems sure to die.

GM Defaults?

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that G.M.’s Cheif Financial Officer said  today that the company won’t be making its June 1 $1 billion debt payment.  The statement is unclear as to whether G.M. isn’t going to make the payment because it believes there will already be an alternative arrangement — either a debt-for-equity swap or bankruptcy, the latter of which CFO Young calls “probable” — in place, or whether they are simply saying that, yes, they’re going to default because they can’t pay.  It’s so unclear, in fact, that the WSJ headline is “GM Plans to Skip $1 Billion Debt Payment,” and, skipping being the recognized economic term that it is, the article is getting some pretty amusing responses in the comments.

So I contacted G.M., and here’s their statement:

A successful bond exchange is an essential element of our out of court restructuring efforts, and we are working aggressively to launch an exchange.  That exchange could still be in process on June 1.  In which case, we would not expect to make the June 1st Series D bond payment.  Should we be required to finish our restructuring within the court process, the June 1 bond payment would be unlikely as well.

It sounds like G.M. is trying to acknowledge both reality — they’re not going to make this payment — and fiction — but they could if they wanted to.  The benefit of the former is that a G.M. default has been talked about for a long time, so acknowledging the inevitable isn’t a bad strategy.  The benefit of the latter is that it sort of makes it look like G.M. is getting pushed into default by the government or its creditors — which might play to some (though not perhaps the best and brightest) as this being Not G.M.’s Fault.

But it is.  Maybe the default will scare some sense into its large bondholders, and the debt-for-equity swap will happen.  Really, though, this makes bankruptcy seem very, very likely.