Tag Archives: gm

The New G.M.: A Green G.M.?

So, G.M. is going into bankruptcy, and the government’s going to own a big slice. Yep.  Please raise your hand if you’re surprised.  OK, seeing no hands up, let’s move on to what’s really interesting here: who exactly is going to be running G.M.

I think the answer lies in the video above.  No, not just in the president’s remarks, where he says that he won’t be making the decisions — in the people who are in attendance at the remarks.  Namely, in his auto task force.

So who are all these people standing with him?  Well, from left to right, I spot:

Christina Romer, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers
Stephen Chu, Secretary of Energy
Hilda Solis, Secretary of Labor
Barack Obama — what’s that guy do?
Gary Locke, Secretary of Commerce
Ray LaHood, Secretary of Transportation and Natty Handkerchiefs
Peter Orszag, OMB Director

Next row:
Austan Goolsbee, member of the Council of Economic Advisers
Larry Summers, director of the National Economic Council
Carol Browner, assistant to the president for Energy and Climate Change
The Mayor from Spin City Jared Bernstein, Economic Adviser to VP Joe Biden

Back row:
Ron Bloom, senior adviser at Treasury
Gene Sperling, counselor to Geithner and member of the CEA
Ed Montgomery, Director of Recovery for Auto Communities and Workers
Steven Rattner, who I believe to be the Car Czar and possibly also the Worst Tie Picker in history

Not pictured: Tim Geithner, who’s in China, and about six other second-tier members of the auto task force, including the 31 year old that the New York Times seems to think is running this show, Brian Deese.  I guess there’s only so many people you can fit in the Grand Foyer.

Image means a lot in Washington.  Obama may be saying, today, that the government is going to keep its nose out of the new G.M., but we’re still a few months away from that new entity, and everyone standing behind him will have a say in what it looks like.

So what I’m most interested in here is that two people — Chu and Browner — are present from the energy/environment side.  The way the administration has tied the success of the automotive industry to the cause of the environment is kind of fascinating.  Chrysler is being pushed toward smaller, more eco-friendly models, and now it seems inevitable that G.M. will be pushed that way, too.  These people — this task force — is built to do exactly that.

In case you’re wondering, as I did, who President Bush brought out with him when he announced the auto bailout, here’s the answer:

Bush stood alone and couched his discussion of the loans in almost completely business terms.  He made no mention of the companies changing to fuel efficient models or of any goal to achieve energy independence, as Obama did in his speech.

I kind of like the new crowd.

Take GMAC Down

The big news, really, is that GMAC needs $11.5 billion (and will need $4 billion more if it takes on Chrylser financing).  Can you think of anyone who would loan GMAC $11.50 right now, not to mention $11.5 billion?  Who should they even ask?  Well, I can think of one guy.  Can you guess?

OK, him too, but I’m not allowed to blog about Tim Geithner anymore, am I?  Keep guessing.

Getting warmer, but who knows if he’ll be able to stay awake long enough to count out the money (which, yes, he might have on hand). 

You don’t even know who that is, do you?  It’s OK; you’re not alone.  Hint: It’s Gary Locke.  He’s the Commerce Secretary.

Give up?  The auto task force guy with the power of the purse on this one might actually be this guy:

That’s Steven Rattner, the Car Czar.  Not really sure why he’s so far in the back during this Shame on You Chrysler Lenders speech, since he’s apparently the guy who fired Rick Wagoner at G.M. and heavily rumored to be the guy who told Chrysler’s non-complying creditors the White House would destroy them if they didn’t cooperate.  (He’s also, according to that first link, the guy who’s eyeing Tim Geithner’s parking space at Treasury — or at least was before his own possible scandal popped up).  Rattner is also the guy who will be poring over G.M.’s you-have-60-days-to-get-it-together filing, which is due at the end of this month.

Also due 30 days from now (June 8, to be precise)?  A plan from each of the banks listed above that needs to raise capital about how, exactly, those banks plan to raise that needed capital by November. I’m guessing GMAC’s plan can be summed up in two words: Government bailout.

So my thought is this: How can GMAC make any kind of plan without including the viability of GM (and Chrsyler, for which it might be taking up sales financing for) in its plan?  And if it includes those pieces of the puzzle, doesn’t that make Rattner the point man?

This seems like a good thing. Rattner’s the one who spear-headed the Chrysler effort, which ended, you may remember, with not much government concession to bondholders.  Rattner has shown that he’s willing to see a car company fail.  It can’t be that hard for GMAC to imagine that he wouldn’t mind watching a car company’s finance wing fail, too.

And though Treasury has said that they will support GMAC as needed, I’d guess that’s a reassurance meant more for its counterparties than for GMAC itself.  This is a bank that probably needs to go into receivership.  It’s a bank that, as Floyd Norris writes, “concluded, disastrously, that a good way to offset possible losses on auto loans was to get into mortgage lending.”  Going forward, what are the prospects for GMAC to revive?

I’m not convinced that a GMAC failure would be the same systemic threat that a failure of Citi or BoA might be.  First, I don’t think it would send a confidence shock through the system if GMAC went down — in fact, I think it’s more shocking that it’s being allowed to stand.

Second, GMAC does provide financing for dealerships to buy new inventory, and then provides financing for customers to buy that inventory — but if a contraction in that particular market is going to happen anyway (and it certainly seems it will, as part of Chrysler’s bankruptcy deal will include dealership closings), why not just hand GMAC off to the FDIC now?  Why not call this bank, and all of its attached pieces, a failure?

If anyone’s going to have a come-to-Jesus meeting with this bank, Steven Rattner seems like the guy to do it.  He’s probably got the clearest picture of GM’s predicament right now, and I hope that qualifies him to deal with their semi-detached financing arm, too.

WSJ: Chrysler Heads to Bankruptcy, Or Fiat, Or Not, Or…?

The Wall Street Journal has a rambling piece about the possible future of Chrysler that starts with this:

Chrysler LLC is preparing to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as soon as next week, whether or not it reaches a deal with its lenders or forges an alliance with Fiat SpA, said several people familiar with the matter.

This sentence kicks off an 1,100 word article in which only three words — “in its totality,” in the last line — are attributed to anyone by name.  The rest of the article quotes:

shadow-wikimedia

  • “these people” (x4)
  • “people familiar with the matters”
  • “people familiar with the matter” (again)
  • “Fiat” (no clarification on whether that’s the whole company, the signage out front, or someone’s talking car)
  • “The Obama administration” (again, no clarification on whether they spoke united)
  • “an administration official”
  • “one person”
  • “people familiar with the situation” (x2)
  • “Obama advisers”
  • “Officials with President Barack Obama’s auto task force”
  • “people familiar with the talks”

That final quote from Fiat CEO Sergio Marchionne came from a conference call.

From this combination, it’s hard to figure out whether there’s any original reporting at all in this story.  It’s also hard to tell what qualifies one to be a person familiar with the situation — let’s hope it requires more than just reading WSJ coverage every day.

The point the story starts out making — that Chrysler is going into bankruptcy even if it cuts a deal with its lenders — is seriously undercut by anonymous quotes within.  We start with the above lede, then travel to someone in the administration and an unnamed Fiat negotiator saying that bankruptcy won’t be necessary, travel to a Chrysler source saying to lenders (via some third party source) that yes, they’re going into bankruptcy so Fiat can pick and choose pieces of Chryster, then finally land on Marchionne’s quote that Fiat is “interested in Chrysler ‘in its totality.'”  In the middle, there’s a side-show story about Fiat seeking a possible merger with G.M. — and the story says both that this will be only a takeover of G.M. European Opel division and a way for Fiat to spread into the American market.

I should not be more confused at the end of the story than I am at the beginning — unless the point of the story is to show the chaos that’s currently reigning within automaker negotiations.  What I get a sense of here instead is the chaos in the newsroom of a paper that sees itself as the premiere source of business news in the country.  Really, it took five reporters to write this?

A friend on OS asked a while back why there aren’t any embeds in the financial crisis — people on the ground, covering the story from within, sending reports back from the front lines.  I spent some time trying to answer this, and kept coming back to the same problem: Embedding a reporter in a bank — in any private enterprise — would seem to be a breach of privacy.  At best, even assuming a reporter did get internal access to the major goings-on, I figured we’d end up with some Bob Woodward-like book on the financial crisis a year after things are concluded, revealing who made who do what and for how much (read that in any way you want — I assume it’s all very messy in the banking industry right now).

But while real-time insider reporting might not be feasible, actual reporting is necessary.  As I rarely spend a day making any calls myself, I’m lecturing from a glass podium on a stage made of very thin crystal — but I’m an unpaid opinion writer, whereas the five reporters who contributed to this Wall Street Journal article about what could be one of the more important financial incidents in a year that hasn’t yet been boring get paid to go out and report the news.  That means not just talking to sources, but getting them to go on the record — and when they won’t go on the record, it means finding more sources who will.  It means telling a story that makes sense, and that’s credible, and that can be tracked and proven.

It also means reporting without a pre-set agenda.  Consider these three paragraphs:

Reorganizing three auto makers on three continents could move the world-wide car industry a big step toward the kind of large-scale consolidation that long has been overdue. For years, auto makers have struggled with excess capacity that has fostered intense price competition and squeezed profits.

The problem has festered because stronger car makers have steadily added plants while governments often have stepped in to prop up ailing car companies to preserve jobs.

Any bid to restructure three auto makers is likely to prove highly complex and risky for the companies involved and the Obama administration. Chrysler is in such bad shape precisely because its cross-border merger with Daimler AG ended in failure after eight years.

That may all be true, but I have no idea who’s claiming it.  Who says consolidation is long overdue?  The reporters?  Half of the reporters?  An unnamed source?  The Wall Street Journal itself?

Hundreds of experts exist in the U.S. who would have been willing to assist in this story, even on a Thursday when there’s good new T.V. to watch.  Likewise, though perhaps no one directly involved with the ongoing negotiations might be willing to go on the record, official sources at all of the companies involved get paid to answer media inquiries, and I bet even their non-denial denials of the statements above would have told us something.

Beyond even that, every time the government thinks about making a deal, a tree dies.  There’s paper out there.  Someone must have been willing to hand over a report or a sketch of where things could be headed.  Someone must be already working on the court filing for Chrysler.

I agree whole-heartedly with Glenn Greenwald that anonymity is being granted all too often these days, and I think we’re in more danger of being complacent about it when it appears in an article full of numbers and semi-familiar economic arguments.  The more complex the argument, the more carefully it should be explained.  The more controversial the event, the higher the bar for granting anonymity.

The more I read of the Wall Street Journal, the more frustrated I get.

GM Defaults?

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that G.M.’s Cheif Financial Officer said  today that the company won’t be making its June 1 $1 billion debt payment.  The statement is unclear as to whether G.M. isn’t going to make the payment because it believes there will already be an alternative arrangement — either a debt-for-equity swap or bankruptcy, the latter of which CFO Young calls “probable” — in place, or whether they are simply saying that, yes, they’re going to default because they can’t pay.  It’s so unclear, in fact, that the WSJ headline is “GM Plans to Skip $1 Billion Debt Payment,” and, skipping being the recognized economic term that it is, the article is getting some pretty amusing responses in the comments.

So I contacted G.M., and here’s their statement:

A successful bond exchange is an essential element of our out of court restructuring efforts, and we are working aggressively to launch an exchange.  That exchange could still be in process on June 1.  In which case, we would not expect to make the June 1st Series D bond payment.  Should we be required to finish our restructuring within the court process, the June 1 bond payment would be unlikely as well.

It sounds like G.M. is trying to acknowledge both reality — they’re not going to make this payment — and fiction — but they could if they wanted to.  The benefit of the former is that a G.M. default has been talked about for a long time, so acknowledging the inevitable isn’t a bad strategy.  The benefit of the latter is that it sort of makes it look like G.M. is getting pushed into default by the government or its creditors — which might play to some (though not perhaps the best and brightest) as this being Not G.M.’s Fault.

But it is.  Maybe the default will scare some sense into its large bondholders, and the debt-for-equity swap will happen.  Really, though, this makes bankruptcy seem very, very likely.